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<p>In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) organized crime has virtually taken control of the State. The resultant impact has been the paralysis of democratic development, alienation of ordinary citizens, and correspondingly the failure and distrust of the state legal and security services in a region that is already extremely unstable. The degradation of state institutions (especially police and judiciary), a breakdown in law and order, and a loss public confidence in the government are symptomatic of conditions we have seen in other parts of the region and the world that have lead to state failure. As the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom have shown the U.S., and consequently the geographic combatant commander, can ill afford to ignore distressed or failing states. For the combatant commander a new staff organization called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) provides him with an additional "tool" or means to influence actions not normally associated with traditional military functions. Designed to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies in order to improve planning and coordination primarily to combat terrorism, the make-up and focus of the JIACG is optimally positioned to address the issue of organized crime's destabilizing influence on FYROM. This paper examines the role of the US European Command (USEUCOM) JIACG in mitigating the risk for the commander of potential state failure in FYROM as a result of the destabilizing influence of organized crime on its government and society.</p>					
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THE POTENTIALITY FOR STATE FAILURE VIA ORGANIZED CRIME. ACTIONS
OF THE JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP (JIACG) IN MITIGATING
RISK FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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16 May 2003

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Abstract

THE POTENTIALITY FOR STATE FAILURE VIA ORGANIZED CRIME. ACTIONS OF THE JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP (JIACG) IN MITIGATING RISK FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) organized crime has virtually taken control of the State. The resultant impact has been the paralysis of democratic development, alienation of ordinary citizens, and correspondingly the failure and distrust of the state legal and security services in a region that is already extremely unstable. The degradation of state institutions (especially police and judiciary), a breakdown in law and order, and a loss public confidence in the government are symptomatic of conditions we have seen in other parts of the region and the world that have lead to state failure.

As the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom have shown the U.S., and consequently the geographic combatant commander, can ill afford to ignore distressed or failing states. For the combatant commander a new staff organization called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) provides him with an additional “tool” or means to influence actions not normally associated with traditional military functions. Designed to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies in order to improve planning and coordination primarily to combat terrorism, the make-up and focus of the JIACG is optimally positioned to address the issue of organized crime’s destabilizing influence on FYROM.

This paper examines the role of the US European Command (USEUCOM) JIACG in mitigating the risk for the commander of potential state failure in FYROM as a result of the destabilizing influence of organized crime on its government and society.

INTRODUCTION

America is now threatened less by the conquering states than we are by failing ones.

U.S. National Security Strategy 2002

Following the events of 11 September 2001, the United States has been heavily engaged in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). After over a decade of debate, U.S. leadership has come to the conclusion that the threat to its national interests and security is not going to be from another state or peer competitor with conventional armed forces. Instead the threat will come from small groups of non-state actors who find support and refuge from rogue, failing or failed states. As Robert Rotberg aptly states in his article “Failed States in a World of Terror,” “Although the phenomenon of states failure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worrying than ever before.”¹ Accordingly, the United States, and consequently the combatant commanders, have shifted their attention and resources to addressing the dangers associated with state distress and failure and the conditions they create for non-state actors to impact U.S. national security interests.

One of the outgrowths of 9/11 and the GWOT is the United States reaffirmation and attempt to rectify a well known and long standing strategic and operational shortfall - the lack of civil-military interagency level coordination and cooperation. Even before 11 September 2001 events such as the attack on the USS Cole, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and our response to the situation in the Balkans revealed a significant seam in U.S. policy and strategy. The impetus of 9/11 has lead senior administration officials to support the establishment of a Joint Inter Agency Coordination Group (JIACG) at the geographic combatant command level to act as a link between those commands with the agencies, allies, and in some instances coalition partners in combating terrorism. Designed to establish operational connections between civilian

and military departments and agencies, the JIACG has the potential to improve planning and coordination in not only activities related to terrorism, but also in areas not normally associated with the traditional military functions of the combatant commander. More importantly, the JIACG provides the commander with an additional “tool” that will improve his situational awareness and assist him in influencing actions within his area of responsibility.

While the focus of the GWOT, and consequently the JIACG, has been primarily oriented on Operation Enduring Freedom and actions against terrorism, the United States cannot forget its investment in another failed state(s) operation in the Balkans. The Commander, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has invested almost a decade of time, resources, and effort into the region. While the current situation is much better than it was even two years ago, the area still remains fragile and in transition. Though terrorism isn't the primary threat in the Balkans, organized crime has flourished. By taking advantage of the discord associated with emergent democracies, rampant nationalism, and religious and ethnic differences, organized crime has constructed huge networks based on the trade of illegal immigrants, prostitutes, weapons, and drugs while simultaneously undermining emergent political and economic growth. Moreover, evidence suggests these organizations directly contribute to the discouragement of civil and legal control thereby directly influencing and creating conditions associated with state failure and the introduction of terrorism.

Accordingly, given the current situation in the Balkans, it is my intent to analyze a single country within the region in the context of the influence of organized crime in creating state failure and how the JIACG can help mitigate the risk for the commander. In particular, this paper will focus on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Referred to as Macedonia for the remainder of the document). Over the past four to five years, organized crime

and corruption has virtually taken control of Macedonia. The resultant impact has been the paralysis of democratic development, alienation of ordinary citizens, and correspondingly the failure and distrust of the state legal and security services in a region that is already extremely unstable. The degradation of state institutions (especially security services), a breakdown in the police and judiciary, and a loss of public confidence in the government are symptomatic of conditions that have been seen in other parts of the region (and the world) that have lead to state failure. The Commander, USEUCOM cannot afford to ignore the impact organized crime is having on the region as a whole. The potentiality for state failure and discord as a result of the influence of organized crime in Macedonia is nearly equivalent to the damage caused by the Taliban and Al Queda in Afghanistan. "The war on terrorism has increased the CINCs [Combatant Commanders] need for expertise in areas beyond the politico-military realm, such as international financial networks and law enforcement."ⁱⁱ The JIACG is just the vehicle to provide the necessary linkage to the combatant commander.

What is a JIACG?

Per U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), "The JIACG is as a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community."ⁱⁱⁱ Though USJFCOM has been charged with conducting the initial experimentation on the JIACG, the utility of the group has already proven itself, particularly in U.S. Central and U.S Pacific Command's actions in support of the GWOT. To date, the organization, structure, and functions of the JIACG has yet to be codified, but given the urgency of the current world situation, each geographic combatant commander has embraced the concept and have staffed and structured their own groups according to their theater specific requirements.

It is not the intent of this paper to recommend JIACG staffing, structure or functional responsibilities; however, in order to provide any analysis to the thesis an organizational framework is required. Since the geographic combatant commanders have chosen to organize differently and much of the available information is still classified, the command and control (C2) structure developed by Captain Bradley B. Smith, USN of the Naval War College in his paper entitled, “The CINC’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) – Essential to Winning the War on Terrorism” will serve as a model to illustrate potential JIACG and staff interaction (see Figure 1.). Furthermore, Table 1. is provided to augment the C2 structure with a list of potential JIACG interagency representatives.

JIACG COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE^{iv}




Figure 1

Table 1. Potential JIACG Agency Representatives

Department of Justice	Department of State
Department of Commerce	Department of the Treasury
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)	National Criminal Investigative Service
Central Intelligence Agency	Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Homeland Defense	National Security Agency

Up to now, the JIACG's primary focus has been on terrorism; however, as should be evident from the structure (Figure 1.) and potential representation (Table 1.), the group can be tailored to address any number of interagency issues for the commander. When considering the scope of the problem facing the Commander, USEUCOM (potential state failure in Macedonia), the similarities of the internal networks and structures of terrorist groups and organized crime, and the proposed organization of the JIACG an argument can be made that the group can assist the commander in addressing the destabilizing influence of organized crime and corruption on the Macedonian government and society. (**Note** – on the basis of information currently available, to date the USEUCOM JIACG has no permanent interagency members on staff).

What is a Failed State?

The problem of failed or failing states in our current international system is like the uninvited guest at a party; the overwhelming impulse is to ignore it, to treat it as insignificant, and to hope it will go away

Susan Woodward, “Failed States: Warlordism and “Tribal” Warfare”

Written in 1999 for the *Naval War College Review*, the preceding comments by Susan Woodward proved to be eerily perceptive for the situation the United States found itself in leading up to the events of 11 September 2001. As is evident from the actions in support of the GWOT and those views annunciated in the latest National Security Strategy, U.S. leadership is

addressing issues associated with state failure with a sense of urgency and purpose that dwarfs any previous effort. Therefore, in order to understand what the Commander, USEUCOM faces in Macedonia, state failure must be defined.

What exactly is state failure? In his article, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Robert Rotberg contends that the reasons for state failure vary, but that it is often linked to a nation’s geographical location, the environment, history, political and religious circumstances or past policy mistakes. Rothberg views state failure in terms of political and economic factors and the combined sum of those factors (which he refers to as the area of convergence) as the main ingredients contributing to breakdown. The following table was created to summarize Rotberg’s ideas of those important indicators/factors.

Table 2. Elements Contributing to State Failure^v

POLITICAL	Leaders and associates subvert prevailing democratic norms Leaders coerce legislatures Strangulation of judicial services and independence Block Civil society Gain control over Security and defense forces Usually patronize a specific ethnic group, clan, religion, etc. Exclude other groups/discriminate
ECONOMIC	Standard of living deteriorates Elites deliver financial awards to families and associates Foreign exchange shortages Food and fuel shortages/scarcity Curtailment of government spending on essential services (water, electric, etc) Absence of adequate medical, dental, and general services. Increase in corruption (Organized crime/gangs)
CONVERGENCE	State provides fewer services Ordinary citizen become poorer Rulers/leadership become wealthier Loss of security (police officers fend for themselves rather than the citizenry) State legitimacy crumbles Lack of meaningful forms of redress Potential for conflict grows

In a similar article, “Saving Failed States,” Douglas K. Dearth asserts that state failure falls into three broad and interrelated categories:

First - [The] weakness of state institutions that do not provide adequate services to the population that do not instill popular or ideological agreement in the society and therefore, do not instill loyalty in the populace.

Second - ethnic, social or economic class or ideological competition which already weak political and social institutions are unable to ameliorate.

Third - the combined effects of poverty, over-population, rural flight and rapid urbanization as well as environmental degradation overwhelm weak institutions and heighten social competition and conflict.^{vi}

The preceding definitions or conditions will be useful when examining the impact organized crime is having on Macedonia and the potential threat to regional security.

Organized Crime in FYROM and the Potentiality for State Failure

Every country has a mafia but only in Macedonia does the mafia have a country.

Robert Hislope, “Organized Crime in a Disorganized State”

Macedonia occupies a central position within Southeast Europe and is often referred to as the “Crossroads of the Balkans.” Owing to its deep seated ties to its former Ottoman rulers the culture has accepted many traits which are not considered traditionally Western European such as the “*bakshish* – the ever-present tip or bribe – as well as certain types of political rule and political corruption are all part of the ‘Balkan style.’”^{vii} Accordingly, the general population within Macedonia is not uncomfortable with a “manageable” level of graft and vice. However, following the collapse of the communist system and frontier controls throughout most of the Balkans, organized crime syndicates began to flourish resulting in lawlessness and civil conflict. Due to the lack of strong institutions and control mechanisms, these syndicates found an ideal

situation to exploit in the Macedonian political structure, especially as it transitions from a communist totalitarian system to a democratic, free market economy.

Robert Hislope in his article “Organized Crime in a Disorganized State” contends Macedonia has unfortunately become a State synonymous with organized crime and corruption. According to Hislope, “The Macedonian state itself encompasses a thoroughly corrupt set of institutions that has stymied democratic development, alienated ordinary citizens, and de-legitimized the idea of an ethnically neutral, citizen-based, liberal state, especially among the Albanians.”^{viii} While the country has struggled to overcome the internal conflict of 2001, the state still remains heavily influenced by organized crime and corruption.

Organized crime is one of the largest employers in Macedonia. Corruption began to flourish after the international community imposed its economic embargo on neighboring Yugoslavia in 1992. With the vacuum created in neighboring Serbia, Macedonia became a hub for the black market. Everything Serbia needed - fuel, medicine, coffee, cigarettes – passed through Macedonia while everyone from politicians to customs officials to policemen profited. United Press International (UPI) reported that Greek intelligence officials had offered that,

Skopje, even before the current rebellion, had become an "anything-goes" open city. They said regional Balkan crime syndicates and major Russian criminal organizations alike were taking advantage of the weak young national government and the chaotic conditions caused by the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo conflict. These groups had made Macedonia a major center for drug smuggling and traffic in the so-called "white slave trade" of organized prostitution that has grown apace in Central Europe over the past decade, the Greek sources said. "Peace and stability are not profitable to the criminal elements in Macedonia and they are now very well entrenched," he said. As a result, he predicted, the rebellion would prove to be "a long-enduring conflict of low intensity. The problem is that because of it, people there (in Macedonia) are not trusting each other any more."^{ix}

According to Louise Shelley, Director of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University, Washington DC, organized crime in the Balkans is "a complex amalgam of local and international crime groups."^x They are different from that of the traditional Sicilian

mafia wherein they are based on network structures that cooperate loosely with one and other, "Performing functions on the local level, they cannot easily be dislodged because of weak government, local passivity, and even outright complicity."^{xi}

Christopher Corpora, an associate of Dr. Shelley, and an analyst with the US Department of Defense, believes that the history of authoritarian regimes in the Balkans has led to the creation of a strong informal network among the common people, some of whom have turned to crime, thus preventing the development of civil society. "Capitalizing on the weak, financially strapped governments that lack significant social control, these groups survive by providing goods and service the government cannot."^{xii} Moreover, the harmful expansion of crime has become part of the process of privatization of big companies. Flawed privatization deals have raised criminal elements into the executive ranks of banks and airlines to name but a few. One of the consequences of this is that the corruption and intervention of criminal groups into the privatization process has a long-term distributive impact on the development and vitality of the system as a whole. Many citizens have been denied access to the capital necessary for developing small entrepreneurial businesses thereby stunting the development of the middle class. Consequently, a gap has been created between a small but influential elite and a greater layer of poor. Therefore, the middle class cannot develop because of the polarization of the society due to the influence of the criminal element in the political and privatization process resulting in a huge gap between the "haves" and "have nots."

According to Corpora, the link between renegade countries, organized crime and terrorist organizations is also obvious, with Balkans corruption thriving through informal structures that closely resemble terrorist networks. There is evidence that Albanian guerilla groups are linked with organized crime. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (primarily based out of Macedonia)

has been admittedly linked to organized crime and has been implicated in terrorist like activities. In particular, the KLA have funded their activities in the region through drugs and smuggling. Correspondingly, evidence suggests that the guerrillas claiming to be fighting for equal rights, the development of better schools and the recent constitutional amendment in Macedonia weren't so much fighting for those constitutional reforms as they were fighting for control of a growing Albanian-run criminal empire. Speculation is that these kingpins are actively seeking to destabilize the entire region because peace is bad for business. Moreover, the impact the KLA and organized crime had in the 2001 internal conflict "obliged Macedonia to increase its spending on defense and internal security"^{xiii} at the expense of other necessary services. The estimated cost to Macedonia was "well in excess of \$500 million (or c. 15% of its GDP)." ^{xiv}

Many experts believe that organized crime is flourishing in Macedonia (as well as the republics of the former Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries) because the rule of law is frail and the judiciary is not independent. Some argue that the issues are predominantly a police problem that can only be resolved with the help of strong police forces and law enforcement. However, this view fails to take into consideration that in order for the rule of law to function there must be trust in the government, an independent judiciary and uncorrupted officials. Evidence shows the syndicates have great influence upon political life within Macedonia to the point of being able to influence and present national positions and platforms. Sadly, Organized crime enjoys the protection of high-ranking Macedonian politicians, judges and prosecutors who are generously bribed further eroding public confidence in the overall system.

Why is Organized Crime Important to the Commander USEUCOM?

There are at least three distinct, yet interrelated reasons organized crime and its impact upon Macedonia are important to the combatant commander. First, in December 2002, the Council on

Foreign Relations released an independent study, *Balkans 2010*, wherein it concluded that high unemployment, criminal syndicate, corruption, and continuing ethnic and religious tension could make Macedonia (along with the other regional countries of Bosnia and Serbia) one of the most destructive and destabilizing factors for all of Southeast Europe. The report contends that without firmer supervision and more aid from Europe, the United States, the World Bank, and other aid agencies, the region will increasingly become a major haven for drug traffickers, people smugglers, and Islamic militants. Moreover, without more rapid reconstruction, the regions poverty levels will continue to rise, fueling mass migration into surrounding countries.

"Neglecting these challenges will have a severe and destabilizing consequence for southeast Europe, including growing poverty; an increase in illegal economic activity, including trafficking in people and drugs; further human displacement; and a greater likelihood of political extremism, insurgency, and terrorism."^{xv} *Balkans 2010* also contends that, despite the lower U.S. interest in the region due to the GWOT, the U.S. still has an important stake in rebuilding the area because the region could become a major source for illegal drugs and anti-American terror. Beyond that the report expresses that failure to establish long-term stability in the Balkans will feed criticism in Europe and throughout the Muslim world that the U.S. is more interested in making war than in keeping the peace.

Second, on 29 April 2003, the Commander, USEUCOM, General James L. Jones outlined plans for establishing an array of skeletal bases and occasional-use training areas in Eastern Europe that would allow the United States to reduce its military presence in Western Europe. According to the Washington Post, General Jones said, "As the alliance moves to the east, we're trying to develop a concept that allows our forces to do peacetime engagement around a greater portion of our theater."^{xvi} He also said, "that two former communist states, Bulgaria and

Romania, which made bases available to U.S. forces during the war in Iraq, represent "extremely good candidates" for the kind of arrangements under consideration.^{xvii} Given the location of Romania and more importantly Bulgaria, the basing of U.S. troops in the region might have a stabilizing influence on Macedonia's internal situation; however, on the other hand, based on the insidious nature and scope of organized crime in the region, the Commander, USEUCOM will also have to face a serious force protection issue.

Third, General Jones also serves simultaneously as Commander, USEUCOM and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Therefore, wearing his SACEUR "hat," he obviously has to consider the impact a destabilized Macedonia has on not only the U.S., but also on NATO and de facto the European Union (EU). The EU and NATO have invested a significant amount of time, effort and resources into the region. While U.S. interest may be waning, the security to the region is imperative to the European community.

How can the JIACG assist the commander in mitigating the risk of state failure?

As should be evident from the preceding analysis, the Commander, USEUCOM faces a different threat in Macedonia than he may face elsewhere. The situation, while serious, does not necessarily rate a traditional military response. Arguably, the JIACG, with its integrated military/interagency staff is optimally placed to assist the commander in addressing these issues in a more indirect manner. Joint Publication 3-08 establishes that, "within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of theater and regional military strategies that require interagency coordination."^{xviii} The addition of the JIACG not only improves the commander's situational awareness, but also assists him in coordinating the planning and synchronization of all instruments of national power within his area of responsibility (and where possible U.S. allies and coalition partners).

In combating the threat of organized crime in Macedonia, the JIACG can make its most immediate impact in several areas to include, planning and coordination, institutional knowledge, and information sharing. A fundamental strength of the U.S. military is the ability to plan and coordinate major operations while conversely, U.S. agencies are neither manned nor trained to conduct the detailed planning and operations on the same scale as the military. The wide spread diversity of the JIACG provides the combatant commander with a more expansive collection of area specialists with which to plan, organize, and synchronize the activities of the civil-military interagency team at the theater/operational level.

In the specific case of Macedonia, the Commander, USEUCOM already has a plan for military interaction and coordination in the form of the Theater Security and Cooperation Plan (TSCP). Per the *USEUCOM Activities Handbook*, “security cooperation activities provide or increase warfighting effectiveness, operational access, coalition capabilities of U.S. forces, and military capabilities of a foreign government or international organization.”^{xix} Each of these activities is charged with accomplishing specific regional security objectives to include anti-terrorism training, actions to support the establishment of democratic institutions, and the development of democratic principles and the rule of law. While these activities are predominately focused on military-to-military actions, many of the events lend themselves to support by the interagency.

For example, one of the issues associated with organized crime and failing states is the erosion of state security mechanisms and the corresponding loss of the public’s confidence in the state. Following the internal unrest of 2001, the credibility of the Macedonian military was seriously damaged over the perception of “heavy-handedness” and the leadership’s use of the military to support the “interests” of local criminal syndicates. One of the programs oriented at

security assistance activities in Macedonia is the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). The objective of the program is to coordinate and execute military-to-military events in emerging democracies while demonstrating and sharing American military values and experiences. The commander, through the JIACG, can plan and focus the effort of the JCTP program to address specific issues related to the importance of state security mechanisms (to include human rights training and the importance of civilian control of the military) to reinforce and strengthen the countries security environment and the rule of law. Moreover, with the addition of the JIACG, these activities can be coordinated with other agency programs such as the Department of Justice's United States Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (USICITAP), which has recently been assisting in training the Macedonian police.

Furthermore, within his area of responsibility the combatant commander also coordinates with the respective U.S. Ambassadors. Within each country the Ambassador has his own Country Team that will vary in size and composition depending upon the mission and general importance of the embassy. Currently in Macedonia, the Country Team is comprised of representatives from the State Department performing the functions of Consular, Political, and Economic Attachés, Public Affairs, and a Regional Security Officer, a U.S. Defense Attaché (DAO, supporting the Defense Intelligence Agency), a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) representative, and an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) representative from USEUCOM who works military-to-military security assistance issues. The potential benefits associated with interaction and coordination between the JIACG and the Country Team is tremendous. However, while the Country Team is a potential "force multiplier" for the Combatant Commander and the JIACG, one must remember that the Country

Team works for the Ambassador. Accordingly, the level of cooperation and integration of planning will vary from embassy to embassy.

Another critical strength of the JIACG is the institutional interagency knowledge the various agency representatives provide to the combatant commander and their capability to share information both laterally and horizontally. These representatives will be trusted to be their respective organizations duty experts and will be expected to be armed with the knowledge and background of their particular agencies positions on a variety of issues to include how best to influence problems related to organized crime. For example, some of the necessary skills that will be required include knowledge of money laundering laws, financial disclosure requirements, extradition treaties, and search and seizure rules to name but a few. Given the preceding it is understandable that the Department of Treasury and Department of Justice (FBI) have been the most sought after members by the combatant commanders while the Department of State and the various intelligence agencies have had representatives on the combatant commander's staffs for some time. (It is important to note that currently these Department of State and intelligence representatives do not work in the JIACG. For example, the interagency intelligence officers currently on staff more than likely perform a function within the J-2 or as a member of the special staff. It is doubtful that the particular staff sections would be willing to lose their current expertise to solely support the JIACG. Therefore, this implies additional interagency representation will be required.)

The major stakeholders in regional security in Macedonia are the United States and the EU/NATO. In his capacity as SACEUR and USEUCOM, the combatant commander has a unique opportunity to take advantage of the EU/NATO interagency organization. There is a great need for intergovernmental cooperation on issues pertaining to organized crime. The

response between states to transnational organized crime has not been uniform at the international level nor has it been guided by the same principles, mainly because the type of challenge has neither been constant nor identical in all the countries. Therefore, consideration must be given to what the EU/NATO nations might be able to provide as their particular expertise and knowledge of the region will inevitably prove invaluable. Arguably, given the situation in the region and the current focus of U.S. interests elsewhere, the EU/NATO may provide the commander with a more indirect and less invasive (U.S. centric) approach at the overall issue.

An excellent example of actions already occurring in Macedonia (and an area where the JIACG could "plug-in") is the current cooperation between the State Department and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As part of its charter, the OSCE is charged with preventing conflict, promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the development of open and transparent economies with a focus on organized crime. More specifically, the OSCE currently maintains the "Spillover Monitor Mission to Macedonia" which is sponsoring and organizing numerous policing and rule of law seminars that are held in cooperation with the Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia and the Department of Justice sponsored USICITAP.

In addition to the OSCE there are numerous other international organizations the JIACG could coordinate and plan with in regards to mitigating the risk of organized crime causing state failure in Macedonia. The Stability Pact Anticorruption Initiative (SPAI) for Southeast Europe is an intergovernmental effort lead by the EU. The aim of SPAI is to facilitate cooperation between emerging countries in the region with major international organizations in order to foster stability in Southeast Europe. One of the major functions SPAI performs is to conduct

anticorruption training and inspections to help newly developing countries like Macedonia assimilate into the world market. Additionally, the Department of State is also cooperating with the EU/OSCE and the Departments of Justice and Treasury in the European branch of the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary. The purpose of the academy is to provide assistance to both established and emerging nations in order to develop closer law enforcement relationships and information sharing while promoting social, political, and economic stability through combating crime. Obviously, these are exactly the types of organizations the JIACG would need to coordinate with as it attacks the issue of organized crime in Macedonia. More importantly, these efforts are primarily sponsored and led by the EU, thereby providing the commander with a degree of separation while at the same time encouraging that essential burden sharing from our allies.

In taking on the issue of organized crime in Macedonia the Commander USEUCOM will require significant support from both the US and international community. The first task is to understand the nature and scope of the problem and to identify participants. Working in conjunction with the U.S. interagency and the allies, the commander can synchronize, task and/or recommend through the respective agencies the assignment of assessment teams of experienced agency representatives, law enforcement officials, military personnel, and perhaps maybe even non government agency representatives to evaluate those areas critical to national power and security in Macedonia while ensuring a unity of effort. “Deploying these teams as a priority matter will indicate strong determination to identify and uproot entrenched criminal elements.”^{xx}

Counterargument

Some would argue that the purpose of the JIACG is to focus on terrorism and not organized crime. This is an extremely shortsighted view considering the potential “operational” multiplier the actions the various agency experts might provide to the combatant commander. While terrorism is inarguably the priority of effort for the United States, it is difficult to imagine that the intent that went into designing and recommending the JIACG was for it to only be used to conduct counter terrorism operations. Moreover, anticrime programs addressing various disciplines (narcotics, organized crime, money laundering, illegal migration, terrorism, etc) naturally complement each other both directly and indirectly. The environments in which terrorist and organized crime members operate are remarkably similar and to think that there wouldn’t be some amount of spillover of information and intelligence that would be useful to the commander (in either case) would be ridiculous. Moreover, given the new focus of the National Security Strategy, a combatant commander would be viewed as negligent if he didn’t address those issues associated with state failure (of which a case can be made that organized crime is a major contributor).

Admittedly one of the more difficult issue for the combatant commander isn’t necessarily combating organized crime itself, but in information and intelligence sharing with our allies. Since 9/11 there has been a more open policy on sharing information pertaining to the GWOT; however, obtaining and trading information remains problematic. It would be naïve to believe that countries will openly share information especially given the United States penchant for stamping “NOFORN” on most security documents. However, if the United States were able to reciprocate (at least to some degree) there is still a better chance of obtaining some international

organizational assistance for the JIACG that in turn can only benefit the U.S. and the commander.

Arguably the most difficult issue surrounding the JIACG is resourcing. The collective total of the interagency is minuscule in comparison to DoD and these organizations are neither funded nor manned at the same level as the military. Therefore, it is unrealistic to think that these agencies will be willing to give up two or three of their precious assets to the combatant commanders without some form of compensation. However, when considering the lessons learned from 9/11 (and the past), the United States can ill-afford to ignore the importance of civil-military interagency coordination and cooperation. It is incumbent upon U.S. national leadership to rectify this long standing shortfall.

Conclusion

Helping Macedonia and for that matter the Balkans engineer a successful future “requires a unique combination of urgency and patience: urgency, because problems such as organized crime... present[s] a constant threat of instability; patience, because there are no overnight solutions and because, to maintain public support, these fragile democracies may have to proceed cautiously on occasion.”^{xxi} The evidence supports the impact organized crime is having on Macedonia. Moreover, when compared to the conditions that precede or cause state failure, the situation should create concern for the Commander, USEUCOM. Even though U.S. interest currently lies elsewhere (Iraq and Afghanistan), it has invested too much time and resources into the Balkans to walk away now.

As the most recent NSS underscored, the most immediate threat to the United States are rogue and failing states and the non-state elements associated with them. The political, economic and financial instability in Macedonia is providing a fertile ground for organized crime. The growing

stratification of society, unemployment and poverty has reached high levels and career opportunities are limited. Local conflicts, fear of crime and lack of trust in the capacity of the state to protect citizens from crime erode the concept of democratic governance. In the absence of effective control mechanisms the situation for Macedonia is grim. The JIACG can provide the combatant commander with another asset to address exactly this kind of threat. If properly focused and used in conjunction with both national and international as provided by NATO and the EU, the Commander, USEUCOM can mitigate a potential Balkans Afghanistan.

Interestingly, the majority of the operations the United States has participated in since the end of the Cold War have involved failing or failed states; however, it has taken the cataclysmic events of 11 September 2001 to awaken the U.S. to this situation. As Susan Woodward so aptly stated, "For the armed forces, this prospect appears to leave only two choices: for the military to adapt doctrine, train for these contingencies directly, and be prepared to move early; or for the nation to push harder for prevention."^{xxii} Arguably prevention is the preferred course of action.

NOTES

ⁱ Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs. Jul/Aug 2002. Proquest. (10 Apr 2003).

ⁱⁱ Melissa A Welch, “The CINC and the Country Team: Improving Cooperation to Meet the Challenges of Joint Operations,” (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2002), 5.

ⁱⁱⁱ “Joint Interagency Coordination Group.” United States Joint Forces Command. 10 May 2003. http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm/ [10 May 2003].

^{iv} Bradley B Smith, “The CINC's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) – Essential to Winning the War on Terrorism,” (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2002), 11.

^v Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs. Jul/Aug 2002. Proquest. (10 Apr 2003).

^{vi} Douglas, H., Dearth, “Failed States: An International Conundrum,” Defense Intelligence Journal. 5-2 1996, 121-122.

^{vii} Ivan Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, (Chicago. IL: Dorsey Press 1986), 18.

^{viii} Robert Hislope, “Organized Crime in a Disorganized State,” Problems of Post-Communism. (May/June 2002): 33.

^{ix} Martine Seiff, “Macedonia’s War – Dirty, Complex, Long.” UPI. 09 July 2001; [print article online]; available from <http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/july01/hed3681.shtml>; Internet., accessed 13 Feb 2003.

^x Louise Shelly, “Tragedy, Transition, and Transformation: The Local-International Nexus of Transnational Organized Crime in the Former Yugoslav Republics.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 9 April 2002. [meeting report online]; available from http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.publications&topic_id=1422&group_id=7427&doc_id=7484; Internet; accessed 1 May 2003.

^{xi} Ibid.

^{xii} Christopher Corpora, “Tragedy, Transition, and Transformation: The Local-International Nexus of Transnational Organized Crime in the Former Yugoslav Republics.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 9 April 2002. [report online]; available from

http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=7914; Internet; accessed 1 May 2003.

^{xiii} Christopher Deliso, “Economics and Politics in Macedonia: an Interview with Dr. Sam Vakin.” Antiwar.com. 29 Jan 2002. [interview on-line]; available from <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso29.html>; Internet; accessed 1 May 2003.

^{xiv} Ibid.

^{xv} Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010. (Washington, DC: 2002), 3.

^{xvi} Bradley Graham, “U.S. Military Plans New Bases In Eastern Europe.” Washington Post, 29 April 29, 2003, p.6.

^{xvii} Ibid.

^{xviii} Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I (Washington, DC: 1996), vii.

^{xix} United States European Command. United States European Command Activities Handbook. (Stuttgart, 2002), 2.

^{xx} Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010. (Washington, DC: 2002), 64.

^{xxi} Ibid. 18.

^{xxii} Susan Woodward, “Failed States: Warlordism and “Tribal” Warfare,” Naval War College Review. Spring 1999. Proquest. (10 April 2003).

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